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THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF ASSOCIATIONS
TO ASSERT THE PRIVILEGE AGAINST
SELF-INCRIMINATION
A district court recently fined the Communist Party of the United
States $120,000 for failing to register as an agent of the Soviet Union.
The judge, instructing the jury to disregard the defense contention that
the registration statute infringed the Party's constitutional privilege against
self-incrimination, ruled that "self-incrimination under the 5th Amendment
does not apply to organizations but 'only to living human beings.'" 1 The
fifth amendment provides: "nor shall any person . . . be compelled in
any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life,
liberty, or property without due process of law .... " The words-
"nor shall any person"-preface both the due process and self-incrimination
clauses. Nevertheless, although no court has denied associations due proc-
ess of law courts have held that associations are not "persons" for purposes
of the self-incrimination clause.3 Since the drafters of the Constitution
could not foresee the subsequent proliferation of associations, particularly
corporations routinely organized under general incorporation statutes, only
the unrecorded policy underlying the self-incrimination language can sup-
port a narrower scope for that clause than for the due process clause.
Historically the privilege was formulated to prevent the state from
coercing disclosures from individuals in procedures like those of the English
Star Chamber 4 or the inquisitorial courts of colonial governors and their
councils. 5 The constitutional adoption of the privilege classified the Amer-
ican criminal law as an accusatorial system, recently defined as one in which
"society carries the burden of proving its charge against the accused not out
of his own mouth. It must establish its case, not by interrogation of the
accused even under judicial safeguards, but by evidence independently
secured through skillful investigation." 6 Possibly because the privilege
I United States v. Communist Party, Crim. No. 1010-61, D.D.C., Dec. 17, 1962,
in Phila. Evening Bulletin, Dec. 17, 1962, p. 1, col. 8 (three star ed.), appeal pending,
No. 17583, D.C. Cir.
2Cf. Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539, 543
(1963) (association protected under the fourteenth amendment's due process clause).
See also NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
3 See, e.g., Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906); Bilodeau v. United States, 14
F.2d 582, 585 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 273 U.S. 737 (1926).
4 See 8 WIGmORE, EVIDENCE § 2250, at 281-82 (McNaughten rev. 1961).
5 See Pittman, The Colonial Constitutional History of the Privilege Against
Self-Incrimination in America, 21 VA. L. REv. 763, 783-89 (1935).
1 Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 54 (1949) (opinion of Frankfurter, J.); see
DeLuna v. United States, 308 F.2d 140 (5th Cir. 1962).
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was originated to protect witnesses from coercive interrogation, 7 courts have
more readily accorded its protection to oral testimony than to documentary
evidence." Nevertheless, the privilege has gradually diffused into a gen-
eralized safeguard of individual sovereignty from unfounded government
intervention.9
Much of the emotional appeal of maintaining an accusatorial system
vaporizes when an artificial entity claims the privilege against self-
incrimination, particularly if that entity has great economic power. Fur-
thermore, constitutional interpretation has consistently allowed the Gov-
ernment greater latitude in regulating economic activity than in confining
civil liberties.'0 Thus, the decision that the privilege is inapplicable to
impersonal associations was prompted by the need for governmental eco-
nomic regulation of these associations," and the consequent limitation of
the privilege comports generally with its historical concern with the civil
rights of natural persons.' 2  However, since the compulsory production
of an association's records may at times impair a related individual's priv-
ilege against self-incrimination, courts should not preclude all associations
from ever claiming the privilege.'3 On some occasions, courts must strike
a fair balance between successful performance of a legitimate government
function and the individual's privilege against self-incrimination.' 4
I. THE IDENTITY OF THE PARTY ASSERTING THE PRIVILEGE
A. Assertion of the Privilege on Behalf of the Association Itself
1. Hale v. Henkel and the Visitorial Powers Doctrine
In the landmark case of Hale v. Henkel,15 the defendant, an officer of
an incorporated association, refused to obey a subpoena to produce corporate
records in his custody because their compulsory production would allegedly
violate both his and the corporation's constitutional privileges against self-
7 See 8 WIGMORE, op. cit. supra note 4, § 2250. See generally Pittman, supra
note 5.
8 See, e.g., Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 385 (1911) (dictum); United
States v. Daisart Sportswear, Inc., 169 F.2d 856, 861-62 (2d Cir. 1948), rev'd on
other grounds sub zom. Smith v. United States, 337 U.S. 137 (1949).
9 See 8 WiGMOR, op. cit. supra note 4, § 2251, at 317-18.
10 See, e.g., Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949);
United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53, n.4 (1938).
"1 See United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 700-01 (1944).
12 Id. at 698, 700; 8 WIGmoRE, op. cit. supra note 4, § 2251, at 313-14; Gzswou,
THE FIFTH AMENDMENT TODAY 1, 8-9 (1957).
13 See United States v. Silverstein, 314 F.2d 789, 791 (2d Cir. 1963), cert. denied,
374 U.S. 807 (1963) (dictum); In the Matter of Daniels, 140 F. Supp. 322
(S.D.N.Y. 1956); In re Subpoena Duces Tecum, 81 F. Supp. 418 (N.D. Cal. 1948).
Contra, 92 U. PA. L. REv. 319 (1944).
14 See 70 HARv. L. RE-v. 550 (1957).
35 201 U.S. 43 (1906).
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incrimination. After rejecting the defendant's claim of personal privilege
because he was immune from prosecution by statute,16 the Supreme Court
offered alternative reasons for holding the privilege inapplicable to the
corporation.1 7 Since the grand jury had subpoenaed the officer rather than
the corporation, the Court held that, even if corporations enjoy the privilege,
this was not a proper case for its invocation. The Court analogized that
if B held evidence incriminating to A, B could not withhold the evidence on
A's behalf.' 8 No question of whether a corporation is a "person" within
the fifth amendment arises "except perhaps where a corporation is called
,upon to answer a bill of discovery." " Under this reasoning, even if courts
were to allow a corporate privilege when documents are subpoenaed directly
from the corporation, the Government could circumvent the corporate priv-
ilege by addressing the subpoena to a corporate officer.
The more influential theory formulated in Hale was the "visitorial
powers doctrine." 20  According to this theory, corporations under state
law are subject to the state's visitorial power to inspect corporate records
to prevent violations of corporate charters.2 ' This right by hypothesis
predominates over any privilege against self-incrimination that the cor-
poration might have under state law.22 The Court reasoned that the federal
system requires that powers, such as regulation of interstate commerce and
the taxing power, which the states have delegated to the federal government,
necessarily include state visitorial power over corporations to facilitate
effective government within the national sovereign's delegated sphere.
The laissez-faire atmosphere of 1906 probably impelled the Court to
employ the euphemistic visitorial powers doctrine to obscure an unarticulated
constitutional conclusion-that feaeral regulatory interests denied this cor-
poration a federal privilege against self-incrimination.2 3  The Supreme
1ld. at 67-69.
17The Court's disposition of the corporation's fifth amendment claim may not
be the holding of the case, since the Court sustained the defendant's fourth amend-
ment search and seizure objections. Id. at 76; Proskauer, Corporate Privilege
Against Self Incrimination, 11 COLum. L. REv. 445, 446-49 (1911). Later cases,
however, have treated Hale as disposing of corporations' fifth amendment claims.
See, e.g., Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 382-84 (1911); In re Bornn Hat
Co., 184 Fed. 506 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1911), affd, 223 U.S. 713 (1912).
18 201 U.S. at 70.
19 Ibid.; see United States v. 3963 Bottles, More or Less, 265 F.2d 332 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 360 U.S. 931 (1959).
20 201 U.S. at 75.
21 See Note, The Fourth and Fifth Amendments and the Visitorial Power of
Congress Over State Corporations, 30 CoLurm. L. REv. 103, 107-08 (1930).
22 Ibid.
23 See generally Meltzer, Required Records, The McCarran Act, and the Privi-
lege Against Self-Incrinination, 18 U. CHIL L. REv. 687 (1951). The visitorial
powers doctrine's existence within the state structure does not imply its recognition
in the federal sphere, since the fourteenth amendment does not impose the fifth
amendment's self-incrimination standards on the states. Cf. Adamson v. California,
332 U.S. 46 (1947) ; Malloy v. Hogan, 150 Conn. 220, 187 A.2d 744, cert. granted,
373 U.S. 948 (1963) (No. 1031, 1962 Term, renumbered No. 110, 1963 Term);
see 31 U.S.L. WEEK 3395 (June 4, 1963).
[Vo1.112:394
1964] ASSOCIATIONS' SELF-INCRIMINATION PRIVILEGE 397
Court lacked authority for its assertion in Hale 24 that states possessed
visitorial powers 2 5 Moreover, post-Hale state court decisions that deny
a corporate privilege 26 do not by themselves support the conclusion that
the states recognized that their own visitorial powers antedated Hale. These
courts have illogically grounded their claims to visitorial powers on the
federal court holdings, which in turn have derived the federal government's
visitorial power from the prior existence of the power in the states.
Wigmore supports the result in Hale v. Henkel by arguing that the
privilege against self-incrimination attaches to documents only to the extent
that testimony is required to authenticate them. Therefore, documents ob-
tained through the use of legal process, but which require no authenticating
testimony of the producing witness, should not be subject to a claim of
privilege2 7  Since Wigmore's theory, even if correct, focuses on the type
of evidence and not the character of the claimant, it only tenuously supports
Hale's special treatment of corporations. In addition, the Supreme Court
24 201 U.S. at 74-75.
25 Although the court may have properly decided this issue under the "general
common law" of Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842), prior state court de-
cisions had granted corporations the privilege against self-incrimination. See People
v. Western Mfrs.' Mut. Ins. Co., 40 Ill. App. 428 (1891); Cleveland Elec. Illuminat-
ing Co. v. Hitchens, 3 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 57 (Cir. Ct. 1905); Logan v. Pennsylvania
R.R., 132 Pa. 403, 19 Atl. 137 (1890). In Louisville & N.R.R. v. Commonwealth,
21 Ky. L. Rep. 239, 51 S.W. 167 (Ct. App. 1899), the court did not reach the ques-
tion, but recognized it as difficult.
The Court's reliance on early English cases denying corporations the privilege
against self-incrimination, see McAlister v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 90, 91 (1906) (com-
panion case), was also misplaced, since in these cases the corporations were not
criminally liable under the laws involved, so that a defense of self-incrimination was
therefore inappropriate. See 8 WIGmORE, EVIDENCE § 2259a at 342 n.1 (3d ed. 1940).
More recent English authorities have held that a corporation, like a natural person,
may assert the privilege to avoid criminal liability. Triplex Safety Glass Co. v.
Lancegaye Safety Glass, Ltd., [1939] 2 K.B. 395, 408; Webster v. Solloway, Mills &
Co., 25 Alta. 8, [1931] 1 D.L.R. 831 (Sup. Ct. 1930); Bell v. Kelin, 10 West Weekly
R. (n.s.) 324, [1954] 1 D.L.R. 225 (Sup. Ct. B.C. 1953).
26 E.g., Ex parte NAACP, 265 Ala. 349, 91 So. 2d 214 (1956), rezd on other
grounds, 357 U.S. 449 (1958); Hammond Packing Co. v. Arkansas, 212 U.S. 322
(1909), affirming 81 Ark. 519, 100 S.W. 407 (1907); Lockheed Aircraft Corp. v.
Superior Court, 153 P.2d 966 (Cal. Dist. Ct App. 1945), aff'd on other grounds,
28 Cal. 2d 481, 171 P.2d 21 (1946) ; Commercial Bank v. Atlanta & St. A. Bay Ry.,
120 Fla. 167, 162 So. 512 (1935) ; People v. Ryan, 410 Ill. 486, 103 N.E.2d 116, cert.
denied, 343 U.S. 964 (1951); People v. Munday, 280 Ill. 32, 117 N.E. 286 (1917),
cert. denied, 254 U.S. 638 (1920); Commonwealth v. Southern Express Co., 160
Ky. 1, 169 S.W. 517 (1914); Cumberland Tel. & Tel. Co. v. State, 98 Miss. 159,
53 So. 489 (1910); State v. Standard Oil Co., 218 Mo. 1, 375-76, 116 S.W. 902,
1017-18 (1909), aff'd on other grounds, 224 U.S. 270 (1912); State v. Cote, 95
N.H. 108, 58 A.2d 749 (1948); Board of Health v. New York Cent. R.R., 10 N.J.
284, 90 A.2d 736 (1952) ; Burnett v. State, 8 Okla. Crim. 639, 129 Pac. 1110 (Crim.
App. 1913); Nekoosa-Edwards Paper Co. v. News Publishing Co., 174 Wis. 107,
182 N.W. 919 (1921); Ex parte Bott, 146 Ohio St. 511, 66 N.E.2d 918 (1946)
(alternative holding); In. the Matter of Henry C. Eastburn & Son, Inc., 51 Del. (1
Storey) 446, 453, 147 A.2d 921, 925 (1959) (dictum); Commonwealth v. Evans,
190 Pa. Super. 179, 240, 154 A.2d 57, 89 (1959) (dictum), aff'd per curiam, 399 Pa.
387, 160 A.2d 407, cert. denied, 364 U.S. 899 (1960); Leahy v. City of Knoxville,
193 Tenn. 242, 245 S.W.2d 772 (1952) (dictum); In re Consolidated Rendering
Co., 80 Vt. 55, 66 Atl. 790 (1907), aff'd on other grounds, 207 U.S. 541 (1908) ; cf.
People ex rel. Massarsky v. Adams, 294 N.Y. 819, 62 N.E.2d 244 (1945) (per
curiam) ; AFL v. Mann, 188 S.W.2d 276, 282 (Tex. Civ. App. 1945).
27 8 WIGMORE, op. cit. supra note 4, § 2264.
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in Boyd v. United States 28 clearly rejected a blanket denial of privilege to
documents and refused to force an individual defendant to convict himself
by his own testimony, whether oral or written.
2. Extension of the Hale Result
Because of the Court's reliance in Hale on the technical visitorial
powers doctrine rather than on the Government's legitimate need to regulate
economically influential associations,2 9 succeeding decisions balked at apply-
ing Hale to large noncorporate associations despite resemblance to cor-
porations.30 In Mulloney v. United States,3 ' however, the First Circuit
denied the self-incrimination privilege to a business trust without reconciling
the case with the visitorial powers doctrine. The court found that freely
transferable shares, limited liability, and ability to litigate in its own name
sufficiently characterized the entity as one not entitled to assert the privilege,
regardless of the formal designation of the association.32  The Supreme
Court approved this general approach in United States v. White,33 revers-
ing a circuit court holding 3 4 that the visitorial powers doctrine could not
apply to a labor union, since it was a noncorporate association. The
Supreme Court described visitorial powers as a convenient argument to
justify a necessary government power of inspection 35 and harmonized the
case with Hale on the basis that both cases found the self-incrimination
privilege designed to protect individuals, not collective bodies 3 6 The Court
in White held that no association could claim the privilege if
one can fairly say under all the circumstances that a particular type
of organization has a character so impersonal in the scope of its
membership and activities that it cannot be said to embody or
represent the purely private or personal interests of its constituents,
but rather to embody their common or group interests only.
37
28 116 U.S. 616 (1886). However, the Court interrelated self-incrimination and
search and seizure to substantiate its position. See also United States v. White,
322 U.S. 694, 699 (1944); Internal Revenue Agent v. Sullivan, 287 Fed. 138, 140
(W.D.N.Y. 1923); 3 WHARTON, CRIMINAL EVIDENCE §727 (12th ed. 1955); cf.
Cephus v. United States, No. 17712, D.C. Cir., Sept. 12, 1963.
29 See Meltzer, supra note 23, at 703-04.
3O See, e.g., Brown v. United States, 276 U.S. 134 (1928); Corretjer v.
Draughon, 88 F.2d 116 (1st Cir. 1937).
31 79 F.2d 566 (1st Cir. 1935), cert. denied, 296 U.S. 658 (1936).
32 Id. at 577; accord, United States v. Invader Oil Corp., 5 F.2d 715 (S.D.
Cal. 1925).
33 322 U.S. 694 (1944).
34United States v. White, 137 F.2d 24 (3d Cir. 1943). Judge Biggs' dissent,
however, construed the Hale rationale to stress that the privilege is a personal one.
He reasoned that the Hale rule should apply since a labor union is a separate entity
from its members. Id. at 26-28 (dissenting opinion).
35 322 U.S. at 700-01.
36 Ibid.
37 Id. at 701.
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The White test is vague, especially since all organizations embody both
personal and group interests.38 Nevertheless, the essence of the test, con-
sistent with the privilege's original concern for individual protection, 9
denies the privilege to associations whose interests are predominately col-
lective. Clearly entitled to assert the privilege under this test are small
informal organizations whose members, within the field of common en-
deavor, have interests identical with those of each other member. To the
extent that the membership and scope of group activities enlarge, the area
of group purpose common to all members inevitably narrows. The aggre-
gate of group aims no longer coincides with the aims of any member
individually, and the group assumes a personality of its own. If a few
persons, discharged from employment because of their race, organize to
regain their jobs by publicizing their plight, their association embodies their
personal interests only. As the membership expands and begins to promote
civil rights generally, however, the association at some point loses its per-
sonal attributes, and the members become guided by group goals. The
development of independent group identity disqualifies the association from
claiming a self-incrimination privilege under the White formulation.
Mechanical tests alone, based on the number of members or the time
each devotes to the group enterprise,4o are not conclusive. Other revealing
indicia are the manner in which the association is held out to the public
and third parties' conceptions of the association as a discrete entity. In-
corporation of an association also contributes an aura of impersonality, but
this formal step should not be the sole criterion. The ultimate delineation
of categories awaits the development of a body of precedent analyzing con-
crete situations.
The Court in White did not rest solely on the unsuitability of granting
impersonal associations a privilege historically reserved to individuals, but
it also stressed the complementary factor-the magnified need of the Gov-
ernment to regulate large associations, because their scope of activities often
pervasively affects our society.41 Size alone, however, does not seem an
invariably accurate measure of uncontrolled power. The Court also de-
fended the denial of the privilege to all impersonal associations on the
ground that prosecutors would be helpless without power to compel produc-
tion of documents because nearly all the evidence needed to regulate an
artificial entity is documentary. 42 The Government's need, however, is not
as urgent as that predicted in White. Many incriminating documents will
be in the files of outside parties, and oral evidence will establish certain
criminal activity that frequently lacks supporting documentation.
38 See Fraser, The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination as Applied to Cius-
todians of Organizational Records, 33 WAsH. L. REv. 435, 445 (1958).
39 See text accompanying notes 4-10 supra.
40 See Meltzer, supra note 24 at 704-06; Fraser, supra note 44, at 440-42.
4 1 United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 700-01 (1944).
42 Id. at 700.
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3. The Required Records Doctrine
Although the White rule 43 apparently permits "personal" associations
to claim 'a self-incrimination privilege, in Shapiro v. United States " the
Supreme Court has contracted to an uncertain extent even this protection
of individual interests. Shapiro held that records required by a World War
I price regulation statute could be subpoenaed from an individual, and
hence from a "personal" association, without violating the self-incrimination
privilege. In general, to avoid a self-incrimination defense the Govern-
ment need only show that a statute requires the individual or "personal"
association to keep records as part of an otherwise valid regulatory scheme.
However, the record-keeping requirement must reasonably relate to effec-
tive control of a regulated activity of public concern.45 In dictum, the Court
entirely removed oral testimony from the ambit of the doctrine, 4 6 and the
case has been interpreted as limited to economic regulation.
47
The theory of Shapiro dictates that the required records doctrine not
be misused by the Government to compel criminals to prepare and produce
incriminating evidence.48  Courts should prevent clever prosecutors from
contriving spurious regulatory purposes or from improperly vitiating the
privilege by demanding "required" records unrelated to valid statutory pur-
poses,49 even though Shapiro's broad language suggests an unwillingness
to question record-keeping requirements reasonable on their face.50
A broad reading of Shapiro would be of doubtful constitutional
validity.51 Mr. Justice Frankfurter's sharp dissent 52 focuses on the unusual
freedom given Congress by the decision to displace a constitutional right
by legislating mandatory record-keeping requirements. The doctrine denies
a claim of self-incrimination privilege only if Congress has actually required
records. Since repeal of a required records provision restores the con-
stitutional right to claim a privilege in them, the Court would permit
Congress to control the effect of a constitutional safeguard intended to pro-
tect individuals from incursions by the Government. 53 The Supreme Court
has never reaffirmed its position in Shapiro, and the circuit courts are in
43 United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 701 (1944).
44 335 U.S. 1 (1948); see generally Note, 68 HARv. L. Rav. 340 (1954).
45 335 U.S. at 32.
46 Id. at 27; see Meltzer, supra note 23, at 714.
47United States v. Kahriger, 345 U.S. 22, 35 (1953) (concurring opinion of
Mr. Justice Jackson).
48 See Russell v. United States, 306 F.2d 402, 409-11 (9th Cir. 1962); Meltzer,
supra note 24, at 715; cf. United States v. Kahriger, supra note 47, at 32-33; United
States v. Ansani, 138 F. Supp. 451, 453 (N.D. Ill. 1955), aff'd on other grounds,
240 F.2d 216 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 936 (1957).
49 Meltzer, supra note 23, at 715.
50 Cf. DAvis, ADmMNISTRATIV LAW TEXT § 3.09 (1959). But see Meltzer, .rpra
note 23, at 715.
51 The petitioner's failure to raise the constitutional issue, 335 U.S. at 32, may
have allowed the Court to render an opinion without proper consideration.
5 335 U.S. at 36.
53 WIGmoRS, op. cit. supra note 4, at 367 n.15.
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conflict over the doctrine's scope.M The various suggestions to limit its
reach would restrict congressional control over the self-incrimination priv-
ilege, 55 but retain some area of operation for the required records doctrine.
A suggested limitation on the doctrine in the area of records required
by the Internal Revenue Code'5  would prohibit a contempt citation
grounded on defendant's failure to produce required records and would
invoke the doctrine only to allow jury instructions that the failure to pro-
duce may support an inference that the records would incriminate him.
5 7
This undesirable limitation would not only continue to detract from an
effective right to claim a self-incrimination privilege but also would hamper
the government taxing scheme, since the Government could no longer
enforce through contempt citations the production of documents sub-
poenaed at the investigational level.
Another suggestion would limit the required records doctrine to ac-
tivities that the Government may license or prohibit.58 This argument, as
fictional as the visitorial power doctrine, allows the state impliedly to deny
potential self-incrimination claims in documents as a condition to granting
a license. But the Court in Shapiro seemed unconcerned with the defend-
ant's status as a licensee and did not discuss this factor in delimiting the
doctrine.5 9 More significantly, an activity's susceptibility to licensing bears
no direct relationship to the applicability of the privilege against self-
incrimination. Licensing of activity affected with a public interest should
not automatically remove the activity from the pale of constitutional pro-
tection, nor should the absence of licensing, as under antitrust or tax
statutes, necessarily signify an activity of slight public concern.60
The crucial issue that remains concerns the type of regulatory interest
that will permit Congress' requirement of record-keeping to override the
self-incrimination privilege of an individual. Under the Shapiro approach,
courts will have difficulty challenging a record-keeping requirement justified
on its face.61 Indeed, except in extreme instances a court seems ill-suited
to determine the relative importance of legislative programs and even less
54 Some courts have relied on Shapiro. See, e.g., Newman v. United States,
277 F.2d 794 (5th Cir. 1960); Falsone v. United States, 205 F.2d 734, 739 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 864 (1953); United States v. Clancy, 276 F.2d 617,
631 (7th Cir. 1960), rev'd on other grounds, 365 U.S. 312 (1961). Other courts
have failed to cite Shapiro in cases in which its application seems obvious. See
United States v. Judson, 322 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1963); cf. Bouschor v. United
States, 316 F.2d 451 (8th Cir. 1963); United States v. Silverstein, 314 F.2d 789
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 807 (1963).
55 See Meltzer, supra note 23, at 712.
56 INT. REv. CoDE op 1954, § 6001.
57Note, 42 B.U.L. REv. 227, 232-33 (1962); see Beard v. United States, 222
F.2d 84, 93 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 846 (1955); Olson v. United States,
191 F.2d 985 (8th Cir. 1951).
58 See Morgan, The Privilege Against Self-Incrimnatlion, 34 MINN. L. REv. 1,
36-38 (1949).
59 See Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1, 32 (1948) ; Meltzer, mpra note 23,
at 713.
60 See 8 WiGmoRr, EVIDENCE § 2259c at 367 n.15 (McNaughten rev. 1961).
61 See text accompanying note 50 supra.
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capable to assess the need for a record-keeping requirement to effectuate a
particular legislative objective. Courts should not be charged with dis-
criminating among the record-keeping requirements of industry-wide regu-
latory schemes,6 2 tax laws,63 and wage and hour regulations 64 to select the
ones that warrant government access to records. Nevertheless, the alterna-
tive need not be substantial abandonment of the privilege against self-
incrimination to congressional discretion to require records. The Shapiro
opinion, despite its sweeping language,65 recognizes that the system of price
ceilings in question was enacted pursuant to Congress' war power, 66 an
authority to which the Court has frequently deferred when confronted with
an alleged infringement of constitutional rights.67 By narrowing the re-
quired records doctrine to allow only this clearly supreme regulatory in-
terest to supersede the self-incrimination privilege 68 of an individual or
personal association, courts could accommodate Shapiro to the strong im-
plication of United States v. White 69 that the self-incrimination privileges
of all but impersonal associations overbalance the Government's exercise
of ordinary regulatory power.70
B. Assertion of the Privilege by the Representatives of the
Association on Their Own Behalf
1. Denial of the Privilege to the Custodian of the Records
In Wilson v. United States,71 a corporation president was subpoenaed
to produce corporate documents before a grand jury investigating mail
fraud in the issuance of the corporation's securities. He contended that the
documents prepared and signed by him were personal and thus privileged.
The Court denied any distinction between corporate documents prepared
62 See, e.g., Securities Exchange Act §§ 17(a), 21(b), 48 Stat. 897, 899 (1934),
15 U.S.C. §§ 78q, 78u; Motor Carrier Act §§ 204(a) (1), 205(d), 217(a), 218(a),
220(a), 222(g), 49 Stat. 546 (1935), as amended, 49 U.S.C. §§304(a)(1), 305(d),
311(d), 317(a), 318(a), 320(a), 322(g) (1958).
63 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 6001.
64 Fair Labor Standards Act §11(c), 52 Stat. 1066-67 (1938), 29 U.S.C.
§ 211(c), United States v. Gross, 24 F.R.D. 138, 141 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
65 Professor Davis interprets Shapiro as denying self-incrimination to all re-
quired records. DAvis, ADmINiSTRATrVE LAW TEXT § 3.09 (1959).
66United States v. Shapiro, 335 U.S. 1, 10-11, 19, 32 (1948); see Woods v.
Cloyd W. Miller Co., 333 U.S. 138 (1948); Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U.S. 503
(1944); Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944); MANSFIELD, A SHORT
HISTORY OF OPA 81-101 (1948) ; Ginsburg, Price Stabilization., 1950-52: Retrospect
and Prospect, 100 U. PA. L. REv. 514 (1952).
07 See Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304 (1946); Korematsu v. United
States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). See generally BARRETT, BRUTON & HONNOLD, CoNsTI-
TUTIONAL LAW 1292 (2d ed. 1963).
68 Cf. United States v. Pine Valley Poultry Distrib. Corp., 187 F. Supp. 455,
457 n.10 (S.D.N.Y. 1960); Note, 68 HARV. L. REv. 340, 345 (1954).
69 322 U.S. 694 (1944).
70 Cf. United States v. Ansani, 138 F. Supp. 451, 453-54 (N.D. Ill. 1955),
aff'd on other grounds, 240 F.2d 216 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 936 (1957).
71221 U.S. 361 (1911).
1964] ASSOCIATIONS" SELF-INCRIMINATION PRIVILEGE 403
or signed by him and those prepared or signed by others, since all these
records belonged to the corporation and not to the individual.72  Having
categorized the documents as "corporate," the Court was compelled to de-
cide whether the corporate custodian can refuse to produce them by assert-
ing a privilege against self-incrimination on his- own behalf, an issue not
resolved in Hale v. Henkel, since the officer subpoenaed in that case was
granted immunity from suit by statute.73 The Wilson opinion's denial of
the privilege to the custodian is supportable by the policy underlying Hale
v. Henkel.74 The records belong to the corporation, which could not on
the basis of self-incrimination lawfully resist a demand for their production.
But the corporation can produce records pursuant to subpoena only by the
acts of its agents. 75 Since the corporate records will frequently implicate
their custodian in corporate crimes, to permit him to assert a personal
privilege in the subpoenaed documents could restrict government access to
the records when it seeks to regulate the corporation. 76 Cases subsequent
to Wilson have firmly established the denial of privilege to corporate repre-
sentatives in this context 7 7 and have extended the theory to noncorporate
associations.
78
2. Limitations on the Wilson Rule Based on the Object of Regulation
Since the justification for the Wilson rule is the preservation of gov-
ernment's power to regulate impersonal associations, courts should not auto-
matically invoke it to deny a representative's claim of privilege when the
demand for documents is aimed at the regulation of individuals only. Thus,
if individual interests overshadow group interests so that a given asso-
ciation has a self-incrimination privilege under the test of United States v.
White,79 no right of the state to examine association records could be ham-
pered by granting the representative a personal privilege in the subpoenaed
association documents.
72221 U.S. at 378-79; see United States v. Fago, 319 F.2d 791 (2d Cir.),
cert.,denied, 84 Sup. Ct 197 (1963).
73 See text accompanying note 16, supra.
74 However, the Court's allusion to a custodian's waiver of constitutional rights,
221 U.S. at 382, is untenable since based on fiction.
75 In Wilson, the corporate custodian refused to produce corporate documents
despite a resolution by the corporation's board of directors ordering production.
Id. at 371.
76 Id. at 383-86. The Government can always reach the association's documents
by granting immunity to the custodian.
77 E.g., Essgee Co. v. United States, 262 U.S. 151 (1923) ; Baltimore & O.R.R. v.
ICC, 221 U.S. 612 (1911); see, e.g., United States v. Fago, 319 F.2d 791 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 84 Sup. Ct. 197 (1963); FTC v. Harrell, 313 F.2d 854, 856
(7th Cir. 1963) ; United States v. Kimmel, 274 F.2d 54 (2d Cir. 1960) ; Shaughnessy
v. Bacolas, 135 F. Supp. 15 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
78 McPhaul v. United States, 364 U.S. 372 (1960); Rogers v. United States,
340 U.S. 367, 371-72 (1951) (dictum); United States v. Fleischman, 339 U.S. 349
(1950); United States v. Invader Oil Corp., 5 F.2d 715 (S.D. Cal. 1925).
79 322 U.S. 694, 701 (1944).
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Similarly, even if a particular association is categorized as impersonal
under the White test, courts should not uncritically rely on Wilson to deny
the privilege in all cases to the custodian of the records.80 The implication
of Wilson is that the custodian would have been privileged but for the
Government's exceptional need for access to corporate documents.8 ' Every
denial to associations of an otherwise sustainable privilege concerns a crime,
and hence a regulated activity, for which the association might be liable,
for otherwise the association would have no reason to claim self-incrimina-
tion. The custodian's crimes to which the association's records are relevant
will usually relate to regulated association activity.8 2 However, if the
custodian's claim of personal privilege in association documents does not
involve matters implicating the association in crime or even subjecting it to
regulation,8 3 the individual custodian's claim of personal privilege seems to
overbalance the state's interest in examining the documents. Cases that
have automatically applied Wilson to deny the privilege to the custodian of
another's records, despite the absence of a strong state regulatory interest,
deserve reexamination.8"
3. Limitations on the Wilson Theory Based on the Source
of Evidence Demanded
Despite the Court's refusal in Wilson to attach the privilege against
self-incrimination to the production of corporate documents, it stated that
the corporate custodian could not be forced to utter a "single self-incrim-
inating word." 85 Courts have subscribed to the Wilson distinction
8
by permitting a custodian who has produced documents to refuse to answer
questions about the association if they incriminate him personally.8 7 More-
80 Cf. 8 WIGmoRE, op. cit. supra note 60, § 2259b at 359.
81221 U.S. at 378-80.
82 See, e.g., Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361 (1911) (mail fraud in
securities issuance); FTC v. St. Regis Paper Co., 304 F.2d 731 (7th Cir. 1962)
(antitrust); Dorfman v. Rombs, 218 F. Supp. 905 (N.D. Ill. 1963) (income tax).
83 For example, if the bookkeeper of a large corporation is defendant in a crim-
inal nonsupport action, he should not be held in contempt for refusing to produce
corporate records in his custody to determine his salary.
In In the Matter of the Application of Daniels, 140 F. Supp. 322, 325-27
(S.D.N.Y. 1956), the court's recognition of a personal privilege in corporate books
may have rested on the Government's lack of jurisdiction over the corporation, and
therefore, the absence of all regulatory interest. Cf. Shapiro v. United States, 335
U.S. 1 (1948) (sufficient relationship required between the regulated activity and the
public concern to justify congressional record-keeping requirement).
84 United States v. Judson, 322 F.2d.460, 463-65 (9th Cir. 1963), 49 VA. L. REv.
1372, attempts to limit Wilson in the attorney-client context. Compare United
States v. Judson, supra, with Bouschor v. United States, 316 F.2d 451 (8th Cir.
1963).
85 Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 385 (1911).86 See, e.g., Curcio v. United States, 354 U.S. 118 (1957); Rogers v. United
States, 340 U.S. 367, 372 (1951) (dictum); Blau v. United States, 340 U.S. 159
(1950) ; accord, People v. Monroe, 27 Ill. 2d 449, 189 N.E.2d 350 (1963).
87 Brunner v. United States, 343 U.S. 918 (1952), reversing per curiam 190
F.2d 167 (9th Cir. 1951); Blau v. United States, 340 U.S. 332 (1951); Blau v.
United States, 340 U.S. 159 (1950).
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over, even if a witness fails to produce subpoenaed documents, he may
decline to answer questions concerning the location of the records 88 if
the answers, though individually harmless, are likely to provide a link
in a damaging chain of evidence."
The oral-written distinction suggested by Wilson does not, however,
harmonize all the decisions in which a custodian has asserted a personal
self-incrimination privilege. A more comprehensive explanation is that
although the custodian must produce preexisting corporate documents, he
need not, either orally or in writing, divulge personally incriminating in-
formation presently in his own mind.90 Thus, compliance with registra-
tion statutes or discovery proceedings that require written information of
an association is a process more akin to testifying from present knowledge
than to producing preexisting documents. Although legal process cannot
require any individual corporate officer to incriminate himself, the cor-
poration, an entity devoid of a self-incrimination privilege, must respond
or be penalized. Therefore, to prevent corporate officers' blanket claims
of personal privilege from circumventing the Government's right to cor-
porate information free of a corporation's claim of privilege, courts should
obligate the corporation to answer the request for information through an
innocent agent, such as an attorney, who could not incriminate himself.
91
If potentially incriminated officers are the only sources of corporate in-
formation, they may ultimately have to choose either to allow the corpora-
88 Curcio v. United States, 354 U.S. 118 (1957); United States v. Pollock,
201 F. Supp. 542 (W.D. Ark. 1962).
89 Curcio v. United States, 354 U.S. 118 (1957) ; cf. Fink, The Privilege Against
Self-Incrimination--A Critical Reappraisal, 13 W. REs. L. REv. 722, 726 (1962).
However, the courts will invoke their contempt power to prevent a witness from
obstructing justice by unjustifiably avoiding production of documents. Often the
only way by which defendant can purge himself of contempt is to testify orally
about the contents of the documents. See, e.g., United States v. Solow, 138 F. Supp.
812 (S.D.N.Y. 1956) (prospective witness destroyed records); In re Bleecker,
14 F.2d 1018 (S.D.N.Y. 1925), aff'd unen., 14 F.2d 1019 (2d Cir. 1926) (subpoenaed
officer removed from corporate office) ; Nilva v. United States, 352 U.S. 385 (1957)
(no good faith effort to produce the books).
In United States v. Austin-Bagley Corp., 31 F.2d 229 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
279 U.S. 863 (1929), the court compelled the witness to identify and authenticate
orally documents he had produced, on the theory that this testimony was auxiliary to
production. In Curcio v. United States, 354 U.S. 118, 125 (1957), the Supreme
Court reserved the question of this principle's validity. If merely authenticating the
documents would incriminate the witness, the rationale of Curcio should make the
authentication privileged to prevent forcing the witness to "disclose the contents of
his own mind." Id. at 128.
90 See United States v. Daisart Sportswear, Inc., 169 F.2d 856, 861-62 (2d Cir.
1948), rev'd on other grounds sub norm. Smith v. United States, 337 U.S. 137 (1949).
91 See United States v. 3963 Bottles, More or Less, 265 F.2d 332, 336 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 360 U.S. 931 (1959); United States v. 42 Jars "Bee Royale
Capsules," 162 F. Supp. 944 (D.N.J. 1958), af'd, 264 F.2d 666 (3d Cir. 1959).
But see Baltimore & O.R.R. v. ICC, 221 U.S. 612 (1911), in which the Supreme
Court held a corporate officer bound by his superior corporate obligation to supply
information required by a statute, despite the possibility of incriminating himself.
If this case is deemed a forerunner of the "required records" exception, see text
accompanying n6tes 43-70 supra, the privilege was properly denied regardless of its
claimant. However, if in the nonrequired records situation, the identity of the person
supplying the information to the innocent agent is in itself a possibly incriminating
fact, the court must provide safeguards against this information being revealed.
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tion to be held in contempt or to furnish the information incriminating
themselves.
Reference to basic self-incrimination justifications also highlights an
ambiguity inherent in McPhaul v. United States.92 In both McPhaul and
Curcio v. United States,93 custodians refused to produce subpoenaed docu-
ments or to answer questions concerning their location, presumably because
revealing this knowledge would tend to implicate them in criminal activity.
The defendant in Curcio was cited for contempt for not testifying about the
documents' location and in McPhaul for not producing the documents. The
Court in Curcio upheld the witness' privilege to refuse to answer questions
about the location of the unproduced records to avoid "disclos[ing] the
contents of his own mind." 94 In McPhaul, however, the Court required
the witness to produce documents within his control, apparently disregard-
ing that McPhaul seemed to claim that disclosing knowledge of the docu-
ments' location would tend to incriminate him.95 However, testimony and
production are indistinguishable in the rare case when mere knowledge of
the documents' location is the incriminating fact, since both require the
witness to reveal the same knowledge from within his own mind.9 6 Con-
sistency obliges the courts to insure that the alleged incrimination is re-
vealed solely by the content of preexisting documents before it denies a
custodian his privilege.
C. Assertion of the Privilege by the Association on Behalf of the Members
In Hale v. Henkel,97 the Court, obviously relying on the language of
the fifth amendment,98 asserted that B could not withhold evidence in-
criminating only A, since the privilege must be asserted by the incriminated
party. Although the statement seems correct if B is in no special relation-
ship with A, there may be occasions when the parties' interests are so
united, as those of attorney and client, that one party should be able to
claim the privilege on behalf of the other. Some cases have, in fact, made
exceptions to the general rule by permitting attorneys to invoke a client's
fifth amendment privilege in client's papers possessed by the attorney
02 364 U.S. 372 (1960).
93354 U.S. 118 (1957).
94 Id. at 128.
95 McPhaul apparently claimed that knowledge of the documents' location was
the incriminating fact:
"Mr. Wood: . . .Are you prepared to produce the [subpoenaed] docu-
ments . .. .
"Mr. McPhaul: Mr. Wood, I refuse to answer this or any question
which deals with the possession or custody of the books and records called
for in the subpoena. I claim my privilege under the fifth amendment of the
Constitution.
364 U.S. at 375. (Emphasis added.)
96 Curcio v. United States, 354 U.S. 118, 128 (1957).
97 201 U.S. 43, 70 (1906).
98 See text accompanying note 18, supra.
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because of both the personal bond between client and attorney and the
exigencies of properly defending a complex litigation. °9
An association deemed impersonal under the test of United States v.
White '0 seems sufficiently distinct from its members to be prevented from
withholding evidence by claiming its members' privileges. But "personal"
associations present elements of necessity '' and intimacy analogous to the
attorney-client relationship. The courts should recognize a limited excep-
tion to the general rule prohibiting assertion of another's privilege and en-
able a member of a "personal" association to require the association or the
custodian of its records to assert the member's self-incrimination privilege
in the records. This result protects the rationale of White; for, if a "per-
sonal" association or its custodian were not criminally liable under the
relevant statutes or were granted immunity, the Government could subvert
White's concern for individuals by compelling the production of association
records incriminating the members. 10 2
III. APPLICA3ILITY OF THE SELF-INcRIMINATION PRIVILEGE
IN SELECTED CONTEXTS
A. Partnerships
1. Per Se Applications
The unsettled application of the privilege to records of partnerships
derives from both the surprising paucity of appellate decisions on point
0 3
and the inconsistent decisions of the district courts.1°0 One approach, based
9 9 United States v. Judson, 322 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1963) ; Application of House,
144 F. Supp. 95 (N.D. Cal. 1956). But see Bouschor v. United States, 316 F.2d 451,
458 (8th Cir. 1963) ; United States v. Boccuto, 175 F. Supp. 886 (D.N.J. 1959).
100 322 U.S. 694, 701 (1944); see text accompanying note 37, supra.
101In NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958), the association had standing
to assert its members' first amendment rights, since they would otherwise have been
irretrievably lost. Accord, Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Comm., 372
U.S. 539 (1963); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963); Bates v. Little Rock,
361 U.S. 516 (1960); CORE v. Douglas, 318 F.2d 95 (5th Cir. 1963); cf. Labor
Youth League v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 322 F.2d 364 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
Similarly, if the unique unity of interests in the relationships of attorney-client and
"personal" association-member obtains, courts should allow one party to claim the
other's self-incrimination privilege if necessary to avoid its circumvention.
102 See 44 CAIF. L. Rzv. 408, 411 (1956); cf. United States v. Goodman, 190
F. Supp. 847, 850 (N.D. Ill. 1961) (dictum).
103The Supreme Court has not yet decided the self-incrimination privilege's
application to partnerships. The only circuit court decision is United States v.
Silverstein, 314 F.2d 789 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 807 (1963), affirming
210 F. Supp. 401 (S.D.N.Y. 1962). In two other cases, United States v. Achilli,
234 F.2d 797 (7th Cir. 1956), aff'd, 353 U.S. 373 (1957), and Levin v. United States,
5 F.2d 598 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 269 U.S. 562 (1925), the circuit courts did not
reach the issue because the defendants had waived their constitutional rights by
failing to assert a timely claim. In Austin v. United States, 297 F.2d 356 (4th
Cir. 1961), the circuit court remanded to the district court for findings of fact and
law on appellants' claim, but offered no guidelines to the lower court.
104 Compare United States v. Silverstein, 210 F. Supp. 401 (S.D.N.Y. 1962),
with United States v. Onassis, 133 F. Supp. 327 (S.D.N.Y. 1955), and United States
v. Lawn, 115 F. Supp. 674 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
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on Boyd v. United States,10 5 holds all partnerships privileged in the same
manner as individuals.106 Although Boyd undoubtedly involved partner-
ship books and records, 10 7 by treating the partnership's papers as belonging
to the individual, the Court did not face the issue of the association's self-
incrimination privilege. 0 8 In Internal Revenue Agent v. Sullivan, ° 9 a
district court, again apparently without considering the issue, held that
the defendant's privilege applied to both his personal books and the partner-
ship books."0  Even after United States v. White"' made an association's
impersonal character the key factor in determining the applicability of
the privilege, at least one district court, having reviewed the conflicting
authorities, held all partnership records privileged." 2 The court buttressed
its decision with Judge Biggs' dissenting opinion to the circuit court's
disposition of White.113 Although Judge Biggs thought that the personal
relationships between partners clearly distinguished partnerships from the
labor union under consideration in White," 4 his dissent does not necessarily
support granting all partnerships the privilege since he probably contem-
plated the usual small partnership rather than partnerships resembling
large corporations.
115
The district court in United States v. Onassis 116 would apparently
adopt a contrary interpretation of White and deny the privilege to all
partnership books--"records shared with others as an incident of a formal
business combination." 117 The court seemed to approve the result of a
related case 118 involving the same transactions, but decided earlier by a
different court, in which the same partnership was held impersonal under
White." 9 But its expressed rationale reverted to the rigid reasoning of
Hale v. Henkel 120 that one person cannot raise another's privilege.
121
105 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
106 See United States v. Brasley, 268 Fed. 59 (W.D. Pa. 1920).
107 See United States v. Silverstein, 314 F.2d 789, 790 (2d Cir. 1963).
108 See 111 U. PA. L. Rav. 1021, 1026 n.57 (1963).
109 287 Fed. 138 (W.D.N.Y. 1923).
110In United States v. Lawn, 115 F. Supp. 674 (S.D.N.Y. 1953), appeal dis-
missed on other grounds sub nor. United States v. Roth, 208 F.2d 467 (2d Cir.
1953), the court reached the same result without any supporting rationale.
" 322 U.S. 694 (1944).
112 United States v. Linen Serv. Council, 141 F. Supp. 511 (D.N.J. 1956).
113 United States v. White, 137 F.2d 24, 27-28 (3d Cir. 1943) (Biggs, J., dis-
senting).
114 Ibid.
315 The most modem of this type of "partnership," the Real Estate Investment
Trust, is patterned after a limited partnership, but more closely resembles a large
corporation. See Forbes, Feb. 1, 1963, pp. 16-17. See note 126 infra and accom-
panying text
116 133 F. Supp. 327 (S.D.N.Y. 1955), 44 CAi.n'. L. REv. 408 (1956).
117 United States v. Onassis, 133 F. Supp. 327, 335 (S.D.N.Y. 1955) (dictum).
118 United States v. Onassis, 125 F. Supp. 190 (D.D.C. 1954).
119 See United States v. Onassis, 133 F. Supp. 327, 334 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
120 See text accompanying notes 16-23 supra.
22 133 F. Supp. at 331.
[Vol.l12:394
1964] ASSOCIATIONS' SELF-INCRIMINATION PRIVILEGE 409
This approach, if uniformly applied, would dearly conflict with the White
formulation.
22
2. Application of the White Test to Partnerships
Several decisions have applied White to partnerships.m In United
States v. Silverstein,'24 the only circuit court case squarely facing the
issue, 2 5 the defendant was a general partner in four limited partnerships,
each having many limited partners and large capitalizations.12 6 The court,
finding the partnerships impersonal associations under White, denied the
general partner's claim of privilege in the partnership books. The large
number of partners and the substantial capitalizations impelled the court
to find that "the interests of the partners in common far dominate any
personal interest." 127 Moreover, the large capitalizations suggest a wide
scope of partnership activities with accompanying economic influence, which
magnifies the Government's need for effective regulation.125 The adoption
of a limited partnership form, providing centralized management with the
different groups of participants resembling either shareholders or officers,
also contributed to the partnership's independent identity, but the court
noted that the form of organization chosen does not establish an asso-
ciation's "personality" under the White test.29
In United States v. Onassis,13 0 the court found impersonal an asso-
ciation of seven general and four limited partners. Although the number
of partners was significantly fewer than in Silverstein, the court relied on
the international scope of activities, the large staff of employees, and the
partnership's practice of dealing in the firm name. 13 '
122 See text accompanying note 130 supra.
123 United States v. Silverstein, 314 F.2d 789 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 374 U.S.
807 (1963), affirming 210 F. Supp. 401 (S.D.N.Y. 1962); United States v. Onassis,
125 F. Supp. 190 (D.D.C. 1954); It re Subpoena Duces Tecum, 81 F. Supp. 418
(N.D. Cal. 1948), 35 VA. L. REv. 506 (1949); accord, Hotel & Restaurant Comm'n
v. Zucker, 116 So. 2d 642 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1959) ; Layman v. Webb, 350 P.2d 323
(Okla. Crim. App. 1960).
124 314 F.2d 789 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 807 (1963), affirming 210 F.
Supp. 401 (S.D.N.Y. 1962), 63 CoLum. L. Ray. 1319 (1963).
125 The case, at least, settles the conflict within the second circuit, which had
applied diverse approaches. Compare United States v. Lawn, 115 F. Supp. 674
(S.D.N.Y. 1953), with United States v. Onassis, 133 F. Supp. 327 (S.D.N.Y. 1955),
and United States v. Silverstein, 210 F. Supp. 401 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
126 General Limited
Partnership Partners Partners Capitalization
1 3 26 $ 340,000.
2 3 55 1,070,000.
3 3 25 225,000.
4 3 119 2,740,000.
The partnerships dealt in real estate. United States v. Silverstein, 210 F. Supp.
401, 405 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
12 314 F.2d at 791.
128 See United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 700 (1944).
12 314 F.2d at 791.
3o 125 F. Supp. 190 (D.D.C. 1954).
131 Id. at 208-10.
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A partnership was held to be acting in the partners' personal interests
in In re Subpoena Duces Tecum," 32 since the partnership consisted of only
six persons, all related to each other. However, the court ignored that the
issue arose on a demand for documents pursuant to an antitrust investiga-
tion of the partnership, a fact that might imply an extensive scope of part-
nership activity. Had the court discovered large-scale operations, the case
might have presented the difficult question of whether the partnership had
sufficient impact on the regulated area to have attained recognition as a
separate entity, despite its small homogeneous ownership group. The court
in In re Subpoena Duces Tecum, having found the partnership personal,
had difficulty implementing the White rule. The Government subpoenaed
only one partner to produce partnership records in "an adroit maneuver
. . . to close the door to . . . [the other partners'] possible claim . . .
against self-incrimination." -"3 The court would have allowed the sub-
poenaed partner, but not the other partners, to claim his fifth amendment
privilege in the partnership records, since the court construed the privilege
to extend only to the subpoenaed party. The court dodged the fifth
amendment claim of the partners not subpoenaed by recognizing their
collective claim, as members of a personal association, of an unreasonable
search and seizure of the partnership books under the fourth amendment.
Enlisting the fourth amendment to preserve the spirit of White overlooks
the Court's concern in White with only the fifth amendment. The unity
of interests between a personal association and its members should obliterate
the usual self-incrimination distinctions to permit the association or any
member to assert the privilege in records personal to all, regardless of the
party actually subpoenaed.1
3 4
B. The Sole Proprietorship
Even though the White test by its terms applies only to "associations,"
some of its relevant considerations might assume significance in similarly
categorizing sole proprietorships. If a two-man partnership were, in an
appropriate case, clearly too impersonal to possess the privilege, the con-
solidation of ownership interests into a sole proprietorship would not
invariably infuse the enterprise with the owner's personality. A one-owner
enterprise, therefore, conceivably may involve a sufficiently broad scope of
activities, enough employees, and a large enough capitalization to warrant
an inference that the business has a personality separate from its proprietor,
so that he no longer may assert his privilege in the business' books and
records. The number of members of an association, though possibly the
weightiest factor under the White test, is not inevitably controlling.
132 81 F. Supp. 418 (N.D. Cal. 1948).
133 Id. at 419-20.
34 See United States v. Onassis, 125 F. Supp. 190, 210 (D.D.C. 1954); text
accompanying notes 100-01 supra.
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C. Corporations
The legal act of incorporation embodies the ownership interests of an
enterprise in a distinct entity, the corporation. But the practical reality
is that incorporation of many small businesses works virtually no change
in their mode of operation. Nevertheless, the courts' invariable application
of the visitorial powers doctrine of Hale v. Henkel135 has resulted in aft
inflexible rule that no privilege ever attaches to corporate documents,:36
regardless of the true relationship between corporation and owners. Had
White been decided before Hale, although the narrow holdings denying
privilege would have been the same, White's "impersonality" test would
have avoided the need for the restrictive visitorial powers doctrine. In fact,
the Court in White attempted to eradicate the visitorial powers fiction 
18 7
and, with it, all formal distinctions between corporations and other asso-
ciations. Although the Court's immediate objective was to deny the
privilege to a noncorporate association, the indicated replacement of the
visitorial powers doctrine with the White analysis would orient appraisals
of all corporate self-incrimination claims to their substantial effect on the
underlying personal interests.
Courts have thus far refused to extend the White approach to cor-
porations.1 38 The unsoundness of mechanical denial of privilege in cor-
poration cases is highlighted by the rule that former officers of a liquidated
corporation may not assert the privilege in corporate books that have be-
come the former officers' personal property, solely because the books have
a corporate character. 3 9 The invocation of a predetermined result when-
ever a corporation is involved usually renders impossible an examination
of decided cases in accordance with the White criteria, since the opinions
do not discuss the crucial facts. In United States v. Kimmel,'4" the de-
135 See text accompanying notes 20-23 supra.
136 See, e.g., United States v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 321 U.S. 707, 726
(1944), affirming 45 F. Supp. 387 (S.D.N.Y. 1942); Essgee Co. v. United States,
262 U.S. 151 (1922) ; Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361 (1911) ; Oklahoma Press
Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 196, 205 (1945) (dictum); Note, The
Fourth and Fifth Amendments and the Visitorial Powers of Congress Over State
Corporations, 30 CoLum. L. Rxv. 103, 104 (1930). Compare FTC v. American
Tobacco Co., 264 U.S. 298, 305 (1924) (Mr. Justice Holmes) : "The mere facts of
carrying on a commerce not confined within state lines and of being organized as a
corporation do not make men's affairs public, as those of a railroad company may
now be," with United States v. Austin-Bagley Corp., 31 F.2d 229, 234 (2d Cir.)
(L. Hand, J.), cert. denied, 279 U.S. 863 (1929): "[I]t is the semipublic character
of the documents themselves which removes their inviolability, the fact that they
record corporate transactions."
137 United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 700-01 (1944).
138 See Wolfe v. United States, 261 F.2d 158 (6th Cir. 1958); Wagman v.
Arnold, 257 F.2d 272 (2d Cir. 1958) ; In the Matter of Greenspan, 187 F. Supp. 177
(S.D.N.Y. 1960); cf. United States v. H. J. K. Theatre Corp., 236 F.2d 502 (2d
Cir. 1956); Lagow v. United States, 159 F.2d 245 (2d Cir. 1946), cert. denied,
331 U.S. 858 (1947); United States v. Friedman, 166 F. Supp. 786 (D.N.J. 1958).
139 E.g., Wheeler v. United States, 226 U.S. 478 (1913); see Grant v. United
States, 227 U.S. 74 (1913) ; Wolfe v. United States, 261 F.2d 158 (6th Cir. 1958).
140 274 F.2d 54 (2d Cir. 1960); cf. Christianson v. United States, 226 F.2d 646
(8th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 994 (1956). Compare United States v.
Carroll, 144 F. Supp. 939 (S.D.N.Y. 1956), affd om other grounds sub nom. United
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fendant, who had incorporated his retail clothing store merely to meet the
demands of a prospective creditor, had signed documents both as a cor-
porate officer and personally. Yet the corporate character of the documents
disqualified them from privileged status, even though the defendant's busi-
ness seemed no less personal due to the change in organizational form.
The creditor's demand for the defendant's personal signature may have
demonstrated that he, at least, regarded corporation and shareholder as a
financial unity.
Cases emanating from demands for books and records in income tax
investigations frequently contain automatic denials of privilege in corporate
documents.141  In United States v. Lawn 142 the individual defendants
were ordered to produce the books and records of eight corporations, three
partnerships, and one sole proprietorship. Admissibility turned solely on
the form of business organization and not on the type of document or type
of offense. Thus the court perfunctorily admitted the corporate records
and excluded the individual and partnership documents. The opinion
reveals neither the size of the corporations nor the scope of their activities,
although the involvement of the same defendants in all of them suggests
that they were close corporations. If all the shareholder groups comprised
only the four defendants, the number of each association's members might
not definitely establish impersonality under White, especially if the share-
holders were also related by family ties. The eleven interrelated associa-
tions viewed together, however, might be the relevant frame of reference
for assessing the scope of activities. If that scope were fairly broad, a court
following White might have concluded that privilege could not be asserted
in either the partnership books, the corporate books, or perhaps even the
sole proprietorship books.
In In the Matter of the Application of Daniels,43 a United States
citizen who was the sole shareholder of a foreign corporation brought to
this country the corporation's books and records, which were subpoenaed
pursuant to an income tax investigation of the shareholder. The corpora-
tion was not subject to United States jurisdiction and was doing no business
in this country. The court stated that because the sole shareholder held the
books in a "personal capacity" he could assert his privilege in them, but it
relied on the absence of government regulatory interest over the foreign
States v. Sheba Bracelets, Inc., 248 F.2d 134 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 904
(1957), in which a conspiracy was alleged between a corporation and the defendant,
its sole shareholder. The court held that allowance of a conspiracy conviction would
overextend the fiction of corporate personality and would punish a person more
severely for committing a crime in corporate form than individually.
'41 See, e.g., In the Matter of Greenspan, 187 F. Supp. 177 (S.D.N.Y. 1960);
Internal Revenue Agent v. Sullivan, 287 Fed. 138 (W.D.N.Y. 1923). See generally
Note, 42 B.U.L. Rav. 227 (1962).
142 115 F. Supp. 674 (S.D.N.Y.), appeal dismnissed per curian sub nora. United
States v. Roth, 208 F.2d 467 (2d Cir. 1953) ; see Wolfe v. United States, 261 F.2d
158 (6th Cir. 1958).
'43 140 F. Supp. 322 (S.D.N.Y. 1956), 70 HARv. L. Rv. 550 (1957). See
note 91 supra and accompanying text.
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corporation to justify granting a privilege not available to the sole share-
holders of domestic corporations. 14 Since the Government thus had no
need to assure free access to the records of this close corporation by with-
drawal of the privilege, the court's result comports with a characterization
of the corporation as a personal association under White.145 Allowing the
shareholder to treat the corporate books as his own would suggest that the
court did not consider the corporation a separate entity for self-incrimina-
tion purposes, but preferred to "pierce the corporate veil" '146 to effectuate
the shareholder's paramount right.
147
D. Non-Economic Associations
1. Lack of Distinction Between Business and Political Records
Dicta in several cases raise a possible distinction between demands for
business records and for nonbusiness records,' 48 for example, those needed
for political regulation.149 When the records of a political party were sub-
poenaed in Corretjer v. Draughon 150 in an investigation of alleged sub-
versive activities of the party's officers and members, the court doubted
that political records were as unprotected by privilege as business records.
Shapiro v. United States,151 which denied an individual's fifth amend-
ment privilege in his business records, may offer further support for thms
distinction, since its doctrine has been interpreted as confined to business
records.152 The Supreme Court, however, stated in United States v. White
that
144 140 F. Supp. at 325, 327.
145 Although the court did not expressly apply the White test, it drew heavily
upon the rationale of the White opinion.
146 See, e.g., Fontainbleau Hotel Corp. v. Crossman, No. 20083, 5th Cir. Oct. 11,
1963 (individual allowed to sue on lease entered into by close corporation) ; Whitney
Nat'l Bank v. Bank of New Orleans, 323 F.2d 290 (D.C. Cir. 1963) (two banks
viewed as one for limiting branch banking); Commissioner v. Laughton, 113 F.2d
103 (9th Cir. 1940) (income of sham corporation taxed to dominant shareholder);
United States v. Carroll, 144 F. Supp. 939 (S.D.N.Y. 1956), aff'd on other
grounds sub non. United States v. Sheba Bracelets, Inc., 248 F.2d 134 (2d Cir.
1957) (no conspiracy between defendant and close corporation); Teitelbaum Furs,
Inc. v. American Home Ins. Co., 375 P.2d 439 (Cal.), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 966
(1963) (corporatiori not insured against theft by sole shareholder) ; Carbone Unem-
ployment Compensation Case, 201 Pa. Super. 543, 193 A.2d 617 (1963) (unemploy-
ment compensation denied to employee of corporation owned by his sons); Basila
v. Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review, 200 Pa. Super. 500, 190 A.2d 155
(1963) (unemployment benefits denied to 80% shareholder of employer corporation).
147 See 70 HAav. L. REv. 550, 552 (1957). In United States v. Foster, 309 F.2d
8, 14 (4th Cir. 1962), a case indistinguishable from Daniels, although the defendant
did not raise a claim of privilege, the court stated that the privilege would be
unavailable.
148 See In re Local 550, United Bhd. of Carpenters, 33 F. Supp. 544 (N.D. Cal.
1940).
149 See Corretjer v. Draughon, 88 F.2d 116, 118 (1st Cir. 1937) (dictum).
150 Id. at 118.
151 335 U.S. 1 (1948).
152 See United States v. Kahriger, 345 U.S. 22, 35 (1953) (concurring opinion
of Mr. Justice Jackson). Mr. Justice Jackson dissented in United States v. Shapiro,
335 U.S. 1, 70 (1948).
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the framers of the constitutional guarantee against compulsory
self-disclosure, who were interested primarily in protecting in-
dividual civil liberties, cannot be said to have intended the privilege
to be available to protect economic or other interests of such organ-
izations so as to nullify appropriate governmental regulations,'
The Court thus emphasized the inapplicability of the privilege to the busi-
ness records of impersonal associations but declined to limit its remark
to "economic interests." McPhaul v. United States,M14 a case in which
documents of the Civil Rights Congress were demanded in an investiga-
tion of the association's alleged subversive activities, may have resolved
the doubt. Although the rights of the representative subpoenaed were the
primary concern, the Court clearly did not read White as allowing a priv-
ilege in political records where none would have existed in business rec-
ords. If political association records had been privileged, the custodian
could have asserted the privilege on behalf of the association, and the
Court would never have considered the extent of the custodian's privilege.
A representative's privilege is denied only to prevent custodians from
blocking the Government's access to documents of an unprivileged
association.
2. The Communist Party Case
The twelve-year litigation involving the Communist Party's failure to
register 155 under the Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950 156 raises
the constitutional problems of Hale, Wilson, and White in the political
context. The act requires Communist-action and Communist-front organ-
izations to register and to supply the Government with basic information
concerning the organization, including its name and address, names and
addresses of its officers and members,157 and an accounting of funds received
and disbursed. In order to apply this registration scheme successfully to
the Communist Party, the Government must hurdle the separate self-
incrimination claims of the Party, the officer-custodian, and the member.
Under the White test, which probably applies to non-economic asso-
ciations, the Communist Party's size and the scope of its activities clearly
denominate it an impersonal association.158  The Party is perhaps the best
153 322 U.S. 694, 700 (1944). (Emphasis added.)
154 364 U.S. 372 (1960).
155 See Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1
(1961). The Communist Party was convicted of failure to register, United States v.
Communist Party, Crim. No. 1010-61, D.D.C. Dec. 17, 1962, in Phila. Evening
Bulletin, Dec. 17, 1962, p. 1, col. 8 (three star ed.), appeal pending, No. 17583,
D.C. Cir.
15664 Stat. 991 (1950), 50 U.S.C. § 781-98 (1958); see Note, The Internal
Security Act of 1950, 51 CoLum. L. REv. 606 (1951).
157 Communist-action organizations need supply only the names and addresses
of members. See generally National Council of American-Soviet Friendship, Inc. v.
Subversive Activities Control Bd., 322 U.S. 375 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
158 See Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367, 370-72 (1951) (dictum).
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example of such an association, since its philosophy requires that the mem-
bers' interests be totally subordinated to the achievement of group goals.
Understandably, the Communist Party is not claiming its own self-incrim-
ination privilege in its current appeal to the circuit court.159
The Party's compliance with the Government's registration require-
ments will tend to incriminate its members since it will identify them as
members of the Party. 6 0 Nevertheless, the Communist Party may not
assert a privilege on behalf of its members. The Party's impersonality
constitutes it an entity separate from its membershp, who may not claim
self-incrimination through it.
The potential claim most difficult to decide is the officers' assertion of
privilege. The original regulations promulgated under the Subversive
Activities Control Act required that a Party officer sign the registration
statement.161  Although the majority of the Court in the Communist
Party case 162 held that the officers' claim of privilege was prematurely
raised, several of the dissenting Justices deemed this provision unconstitu-
tional.163 To cure this latent defect, the regulations were amended to allow
an innocent agent, who could not possibly be incriminated, to sign the
form.8 4 However, no testifying immunity was explicitly granted to the
reporting agent. The anonymity of the Party officer supplying the in-
formation to the agent may be illusory if the court can compel the agent,
under threat of contempt, to reveal the officer's identity. The regulations,
if construed literally, force an officer to reveal self-incriminating evidence
to the state, through an agent, without adequate protection, thus making the
case no different from forcing the officer-custodian himself to sign the
registration form. This case is to be distinguished from the case in which
the Government is attempting to obtain information available to a corpora-
tion through interrogatories or registration statements, and the required
signature of the officer or agent is not in itself an incriminating fact. In
that case, the self-incrimination problem arises only because signing inter-
rogatories or filing a registration form is akin to testifying. But, since an
'59 See Brief for Appellant, Communist Party v. United States, No. 17583,
D.C. Cir.
160 See Albertson v. Millard, 106 F. Supp. 635 (E.D. Mich. 1952).
161 Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1, 105
(1961).
162 Id. at 105-10.
163 Id. at 169 (Mr. Justice Douglas dissenting) ; id. at 191 (Mr. justice Brennan
dissenting).
164 Form IS-51, the registration statement, provides:
It is desirable, but not necessary, that the statement be signed by one of the
officers of the organization. However, if not signed by an officer, the member,
employee, attorney, agent, or other person filing the registration statement of
the Communist organization shall certify in writing that he has been author-
ized by the Communist organization to file the registration statement on
its behalf.
Forms IS-51a (registration form) and IS-53 (annual report form) contain similarly
worded provisions.
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impersonal association has no privilege, the Government has a right to
obtain the incriminating information. Therefore, it is not a severe limita-
tion to force the corporation to appoint an innocent agent to provide the
requested information. 1 5 On the other hand, in the Communist Party
situation an additional self-incrimination fact is involved-the identity of the
person supplying the information.'66
To cure this potential constitutional defect, the courts should construe
the regulations as granting a testifying immunity to the agent or as allow-
ing the agent, even if not an attorney, to claim the privilege on behalf of
the person supplying the information.16 7  This solution would allow the
Government to obtain the Party's information, without carving out further
inroads into the fifth amendment's protection.
IV. CoNcLUSION
Hale v. Henkel's fictional visitorial powers doctrine and its frequently
artificial separation of associations from their agents still haunt judicial
decisions of self-incrimination claims. The relatively untested, and perhaps
aberrational, required records doctrine is a concept of unknown dimension
that potentially could withdraw both individual and group self-incrimination
privileges from most areas of governmentally regulated conduct. White v.
United States embodies the soundest rationale, though its policies are prob-
ably the least susceptible to black-letter implementation. If groups must
be distinguished from individuals in determining the applicability of the
privilege against self-incrimination, the results should at least effectuate
the fifth amendment's original aim of protecting natural persons from
coerced disclosures. The White rule demands that courts penetrate an
organization's facade to balance accurately the Government's need to obtain
evidence with the consequent invasion of personal sovereignty.
H. Robert Fiebach
165 See text accompanying notes 90-91 supra.
166 See text accompanying notes 85-90 supra.
167 Cf. United States v. Judson, 322 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1963).
[As this Note was going to press, the Circuit Court reversed the conviction of
the Communist Party on the ground that the Government failed to prove that the
Communist Party could obtain an innocent agent, see text accompanying note 164
supra, to register. The court held that because identity alone is an incriminating
fact, it would not follow the usual presumption that an organization can always find
an agent to act for it. United States v. Communist Party, D.C. Cir., Dec. 17, 1963,
in N.Y. Times, Dec. 18, 1963, p. 1, col. 5 (city ed.).]
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